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Petitioners1 reply brief addresses the following 
arguments first raised in respondents1 brief in opposition: 
1. At page 8 of their brief in opposition under 
heading "Summary of Argument" respondents argue that 
"Petitioners raise in their Petition several issues 
of first impression herein, issues of first impres-
sion in the Court of Appeals, or issues which were 
uncontested by Petitioners in the District Court. 
Such issues include non-conformance with statutory 
foreclosure requirements, issues of alleged satis-
faction of liability, and awards of attorneys fees. 
Such issues are now improperly brought for review 
and therefore do not warrant Supreme Court supervision.1 
2. At page 9 of their brief in opposition respondents 
argue that "Petitioners' Issues Fail to Satisfy Rule 46 
U.R.A.P. Considerations and Guidelines." 
PETITIONERS1 ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE: It must be empha-
sized that the judgments appealed are summary judgments. The 
Utah Supreme Court has established a standard of review in the 
determination of appeals from summary judgments granted under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). The standard is the same standard as in the dist-
rict courtf viz., the facts are viewed in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. On review the record as a whole is examined 
to determine whether it demonstrates that no genuine issue of 
material fact remains and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. The court does not resolve questions 
of disputed fact, but simply decides whether there is a genuine 
issue of fact which must be resolved at trial. The moving party 
bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. If the moving party sustains its burden, then and 
only then must the party opposing the motion establish facts that 
create a genuine issue of material fact but he need not prove his 
theory or theories. No deference to a trial court's conclusions 
of law is afforded but they are reviewed for correctness. Terri-
torial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989). 
Petitioners1 sole contention in response to respondents1 
arguments are that the Court of Appeals failed to adhere to the 
standard of review in determining petitioners' appeal. 
The evidence available to the trial judge and to the 
Utah Court of Appeals is undisputed. 
1. An equipment lease was executed that contained terms 
and amounts of lease payments. 
2. The lease contained a liquidated damages provision 
whereby the lessee, on default, pays lessor "any and all amounts 
of unpaid monthly payments computed to the date of return of the 
[equipment] together with any loss or damage which Lessor may 
suffer as a result of the breach of [the lease] it being mutually 
agreed that the minimum amount of such loss as a result of any 
such breach as liquidated damages due and payable on the date of 
expiration of this Lease shall be a sum equal to one-third of 
the monthly payments that would have been paid if the Lease had 
continued in full force and effect for the period set forth in 
paragraph 2 above, without consideration of the shortening of 
the term by reason of default." 
3. A trust deed describing petitioners1 residence was 
given as additional security for the equipment lease. At the 
time of the trust deed the title to the residence property was 
in the names of Dale and Grethe Larson, husband and wife, as 
joint tenants. Dale did not sign the trust deed nor did he 
authorize its execution. 
4. The trust deed was foreclosed and Overland purchased 
Larsons' residence property at trustee's sale for $51864.90. 
At the time of the sale there was a total of $33198.98 due on 
the equipment lease computed as required by the liquidated 
damages provision. 
5. Approximately two years after the trustee's sale 
Overland sued Dale Larson for a balance it claimed was due 
under the equipment lease. The suit was brought by Overland 
on an equipment lease guarantee agreement Dale had signed. 
6. Larsons claimed that the lease was in fact a 
security agreement and subject to UCC's Article 9 sale 
requirements. The lease contained many of the factors mentioned 
in Colonial Leasing v. Larsen, 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) and Overland 
referred to the lease in the same terms as it would a security 
agreement. 
Overland having elected to first foreclose on the trust 
deed to recover on the debt represented by the equipment lease is 
as a matter of law limited to the procedures contained in U.C.A. 
§ 57-1-32 with which Overland did not show compliance and Overland 
therefore did not sustain its burden of establishing its right to 
judgment as a matter of law whether for the aggregate of lease 
payments, or for attorneys fees and costs, or both. City Consumer 
Services v. Peters, 160 Utah Adv. Rep 16 (SC #880453, 1991); Cox 
v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985). 
Respondent Overland did not show the absence of a question 
of material fact as to the intentions of the parties on the question 
of whether the equipment lease was a true lease or a security agree-
ment, where, as here, the court did not address what the provisions 
of the lease indicated as to the intent of the parties or whether 
the terms were ambiguous, therefore necessitating the admission of 
parol evidence to ascertain the intention of the parties. Colonial, 
supra. 
Respondents Milne and Western failed to establish they 
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals 
acknowledged Larsons1 (non-movants) version of the facts to be that 
Grethe "signed both her name and her husbands" to the trust deed 
(818 P.2d, at 1322) and "Dale Larson denied ever signing the trust 
deed, Grethe Larson admitted responsibility for placing both his and 
and her signatures on the (trust) deed. . ." (818 P.2d, at 1318) 
4 
and such facts taken as true as viewed in a light most favorable 
to Larsons, the non-movants, would not support the Court of 
Appeals1 conclusion of law that " . . .notarization did not give 
Overland the right to foreclose inasmuch as Overland could have 
foreclosed on the home whether or not the trust deed was recorded« 
The Larsons, thereforef could not prevail on these facts because 
any improper notarization did not create or alter the legal 
relationship between the Larsons and Overland." Because Dale 
did not sign the trust deed there was no legal relationship under 
it between Dale and Overland. It also could not be foreclosed 
against Dale, not because it was improperly notarized but because 
his signature is necessary as required by the Utah statute of 
frauds. Krantz v. Holt/ 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
By its failure to adhere to the standard of review 
pertaining to summary judgments, the Court of Appeals decision 
conflicts with previous decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and 
previous decisions of other panels of the Court of Appeals on 
the subject matter of the standard of review, and said decision 
has therefore so far departed from the accepted and usual course 
of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Supreme 
Courtfs power of supervision. 
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